The cornerstone of any system of livestock production is the stockpeople responsible for the welfare and productivity of the animals they work with. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the industrialization of livestock production is breaking down the traditional relationship between stockpeople and their animals. Commercial livestock production creates a situation of structurally induced ambivalence for those working in these contexts. Besides, the scientific literature on stockpeople is limited, dispersed and specially focused on animals. Whereby, a review of current knowledge (...) about the compatibilities, contradictions, and unresolved ethical dilemmas faced by stockpeople in their daily work and their implications on farm animals’ welfare was carried out. The topics reviewed included: Attitudes and personality; Empathy towards animals; Workplace well-being; One-health issues; and Sustainability challenges. Understanding the stockpeople emotional relationship with animals, gender, ethnicity, occupational roles, educational backgrounds, culture, and generational differences can be valuable for technicians, advisors, scientists, consultants, and owners when developing training for sustainability programs. (shrink)

This w ork ana l yses the response that the Spanish State as a Nation-State, is g i ving to int e g ration of the immi g rant as citizen. Contra r y to those w ho consider that residence has to be the access w a y to citizenship in the f ace of the crisis of the Nation-State and the ge o g raphical mobility that the global econ o m y imposes on people, here the political (...) rel e v ance of nationality is defende d , as an und i vided ind i vidual share of belonging to the constituent p ow er in a harmonious relation with the fl e xi b le concept of residence. This research is d i vided into f i v e sections, in w hich nationality and the constituent p ow e r , the w a ys of access to Spanish nationali t y , the conflict of Nation or State, the characteristics of original nationality and f inal l y , the criteria used b y States to select the potential immi g rant. Th e critical ana l ysis of the Spanish l e gislation on nationality and citizenship t o gether with the theoretical debates, h a v e ena b led us to conclude with a proposal of l e g e fe r enda focussed on a radical refo r m of the concept of nationali t y. (shrink)

Despite the recognized importance of bodily movements in spatial audition, few studies have integrated action-based protocols with spatial hearing in the peripersonal space. Recent work shows that tactile feedback and active exploration allow participants to improve performance in auditory distance perception tasks. However, the role of the different aspects involved in the learning phase, such as voluntary control of movement, proprioceptive cues, and the possibility of self-correcting errors, is still unclear. We study the effect of guided reaching exploration on perceptual (...) learning of auditory distance in peripersonal space. We implemented a pretest-posttest experimental design in which blindfolded participants must reach for a sound source located in this region. They were divided into three groups that were differentiated by the intermediate training phase: Guided, an experimenter guides the participant’s arm to contact the sound source; Active, the participant freely explores the space until contacting the source; and Control, without tactile feedback. The effects of exploration feedback on auditory distance perception in the peripersonal space are heterogeneous. Both the Guided and Active groups change their performance. However, participants in the Guided group tended to overestimate distances more than those in the Active group. The response error of the Guided group corresponds to a generalized calibration criterion over the entire range of reachable distances. Whereas the Active group made different adjustments for proximal and distal positions. The results suggest that guided exploration can induce changes on the boundary of the auditory reachable space. We postulate that aspects of agency such as initiation, control, and monitoring of movement, assume different degrees of involvement in both guided and active tasks, reinforcing a non-binary approach to the question of activity-passivity in perceptual learning and supporting a complex view of the phenomena involved in action-based learning. (shrink)

We study the foundation of space-time theory in the framework of first-order logic (FOL). Since the foundation of mathematics has been successfully carried through (via set theory) in FOL, it is not entirely impossible to do the same for space-time theory (or relativity). First we recall a simple and streamlined FOL-axiomatization Specrel of special relativity from the literature. Specrel is complete with respect to questions about inertial motion. Then we ask ourselves whether we can prove the usual relativistic properties of (...) accelerated motion (e.g., clocks in acceleration) in Specrel. As it turns out, this is practically equivalent to asking whether Specrel is strong enough to “handle” (or treat) accelerated observers. We show that there is a mathematical principle called induction (IND) coming from real analysis which needs to be added to Specrel in order to handle situations involving relativistic acceleration. We present an extended version AccRel of Specrel which is strong enough to handle accelerated motion, in particular, accelerated observers. Among others, we show that~the Twin Paradox becomes provable in AccRel, but it is not provable without IND. (shrink)

La lectura de mapas es una competencia pendiente para los estudiantes universitarios. Es el caso de los del Grado en Turismo de las universidades de Las Palmas de G.C., en España, y Autónoma de Juárez, en México, que usan los mapas para la comprensión de la realidad turística sin que hayan adquirido una alfabetización cartográfica suficiente.Esta comunicación presenta un diagnóstico del pensamiento geográfico de este alumnado centrado en las capacidades de localización, interpretación y análisis relacional de variables territoriales. Se ha (...) corroborado que solo alcanzan un nivel descriptivo y que es necesario poner en macha estrategias didácticas específicas. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The two main directions pursued in the present paper are the following. The first direction was started by Pigozzi in 1969. In [Mak 91] and [Mak 79] Maksimova proved that a normal modal logic has the Craig interpolation property iff the corresponding class of algebras has the superamalgamation property. In this paper we extend Maksimova's theorem to normal multi-modal logics with arbitrarily many, not necessarily unary modalities, and to not necessarily normal multi-modal logics with modalities of ranks smaller than (...) 2. To extend the characterization beyond multi-modal logics, we look at arbitrary algebraizable logics. We will introduce an algebraic property equivalent with the Craig interpolation property in algebraizable logics, and prove that the superamalgamation property implies the Craig interpolation property. The problem of extending the characterization result to non-normal non-unary modal logics also will be discussed. In the second direction pursued herein: for non-normal modal logic with one unary modality Lemmon [Lem 66] gave a possible worlds semantics. Here we give a more general possible worlds semantics for not necessarily normal multi-modal logics with arbitrarily many not necessarily unary modalities. Strongly related to the above is the theorem, proved, e.g., in Jóns son-Tarski [JT 52] and Henkin-Monk-Tarski [HMT 71], that every normal Boolean algebra with operators can be represented as a subalgebra of the complex algebra of some relational structure. We extend this result to not necessarily normal BAO's as follows. We define partial relational structures and show that every not necessarily normal BAO is embeddable into the complex algebra of a partial relational structure. This gives a possible worlds semantics for not necessarily normal multi-modal logics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a rigorous explication of statements ascribing ability to agents and to develop the logic of such statements. A world is said to be feasible iff it is compatible with the actual past-and-present. W is a P-world iff W is feasible and P is true in W (where P is a proposition). P is a sufficient condition for Q iff every P world is a Q world. P is a necessary condition for Q (...) iff Q is a sufficient condition forP. Each individual property S is shown to generate a rule for an agent X. X heeds S iff X makes all his future choices in accordance with S. (Note that X may heed S and yet fail to have it). S is a P-strategy for X iff X's heeding S together with P is a necessary and sufficient condition for X to have S. (P-strategies are thus rules which X is able to implement on the proviso P).Provisional opportunity: X has the opportunity to A provided P iff there is an S such that S is a P-strategy for X and X's implementing S is a sufficient condition for X's doing A. P is etiologically complete iff for every event E which P reports P also reports an etiological ancestry of E, and P is true. Categorical opportunity: X has the opportunity to A iff there is a P such that P is etiologically complete and X has the opportunity to A provided P. For X to have the ability to A there must not only be an appropriate strategy, but X must have a command of that strategy. X steadfastly intends A iff X intends A at every future moment at which his doing A is not yet inevitable. X has a command of S w.r.t. A and P iff X's steadfastly intending A together with P is a sufficient condition for X to implement S. Provisional ability: X can A provided P iff there is an S such that S is a P-strategy for X, X's implementing S is a sufficient condition for X's doing A, and X has a command of S w.r.t. A and P. Categorical ability: X can A iff there is a P such that P is etiologically complete and X can A provided P. X is free w.r.t. to A iff X can A and X can non- A. X is free iff there is an A such that X is free w.r.t. A. (shrink)

It has been shown earlier that while strict localization of the free Dirac particle is not describable within the usual mathematical formalism, it is possible to describe sequences of positive-energy states whose spread Δ x =〈(x−x 0)2〉 about any given point x 0 approaches zero, where x is Dirac's position operator. The concept of a generalized function is extended here to allow for the succinct description of localized states in terms of “Asymptotic Localizing Functions.” Localization of both the nonrelativistic particle (...) and the Dirac particle can be adequately represented in this new formalism. (shrink)

Annals, i. 31. 4: ‘implere ceterorum rudes animos: uenisse tempus quo…’. Implore has been suspected and impellere has been suggested. Andresen says ‘implere… womit, zeigen die folgenden Reden. Curt. x. 1. 28 credulas regis aures implebat’. The passage of Curtius continues not with an accusative and infinitive but with the words dissitnulans causam irae. A better defence is to be seen in Livy, xlv. 31. 6.

It seems worth while giving some account of this MS., because in recent years it has been said to contain certain pieces of the Moralia which it does not, and not to contain others which it does. At the foot of the first page of the text the MS. carries the pontifical shield with the arms of the Medici, and from this it is reasonable to suppose that there was a time when it belonged either to Leo X., who was (...) Pope from 1513 to 1521, or to Clement VII., who was Pope from 1523 to 1534. This being so, 1534 is established as the terminus ante quem of its writing. Towards the end of this century, about 1598, it was acquired by the Spanish Cardinal Saverio de Zelada. In 1801 the Cardinal Archbishop Antonio de Lorenzana bought in Rome a certain number of Greek and Oriental manuscripts which had formerly been in the collection of Cardinal Saverio de Zelada, and placed them in the Chapter Library at Toledo. Included with these was this MS. of the Moralia, which remains there to this day. (shrink)

Alpha‐fetoprotein (AFP)AFP, alpha‐fetoprotein; T3R, thyroid hormone (triiodothyronine) receptor; RAR, retionic acid receptor; erbA, putative thyroid hormone receptor proto‐oncogene products; VDR, vitamin D receptor; MR, mineralocorticoid receptor; GR, glucocorticoid receptor; PR, progesterone receptor; AR, androgen receptor; HRE, hormone response element on DNA; RXR, retionic‐X‐receptor; RAP, receptor auxiliary (accessory) proteins; E, estrogen. is a tumor‐associated fetal marker, associated both with tumor growth and with birth defects. AFP, whose precise function is unknown, has been classified as belonging to a protein superfamily together with (...) albumin and vitamin D‐binding (Gc) protein. AFP has been shown to bind various ligands in vitro including fatty acids, estrogens, thyroid hormones and retinoic acids. The steroid/thyroid nuclear receptor superfamily of proteins has recently become a major focus of biomedical investigation regarding regulation of gene expression. These receptors are thought to bind to DNA‐hormone response elements (HRE) that affect growth, development, differentiation, reproduction and homeostasis. The HREs are known to share DNA sequences with the various members of the nuclear receptor superfamily. In the present report, the possibility of a leucine‐zipper dimerization (heptad) motif in the carboxy‐terminal third domain of both rodent and human AFP is postulated. The presence of nine such hydrophobic repeats in the third domain of the AFP molecule mimics the heptad dimerization repeats found in the retinoic acid, thyroid, e‐erbA and other members of the nuclear receptor superfamily. Computer analysis revealed that the most conservative matching occurred between AFP and the retinoic acid class of receptors. However, other superfamily members displayed 40–60% homology with 5 of 9 AFP heptads. These findings could provide a possible mechanism for explaining the growth‐regulatory properties (both inhibition and enhancement) that have been ascribed to AFP in the last decade. (shrink)

First-order logic is known to have a severely limited expressive power on finite structures. As a result, several different extensions have been investigated, including fragments of second-order logic, fixpoint logic, and the infinitary logic L∞ωω in which every formula has only a finite number of variables. In this paper, we study generalized quantifiers in the realm of finite structures and combine them with the infinitary logic L∞ωω to obtain the logics L∞ωω, where Q = {Qi: iε I} is a family (...) of generalized quantifiers on finite structures. Using the logics L∞ωω, we can express polynomial-time properties that are not definable in L∞ωω, such as “there is an even number of x” and “there exists at least n/2 x” , without going to second-order logic. We show that equivalence of finite structures relative to L∞ωω can be characterized in terms of certain pebble games that are a variant of the Ehrenfeucht—Fraïssé games. We combine this game-theoretic characterization with sophisticated combinatorial tools from Ramsey theory, such as van der Waerden's Theorem and Folkman's Theorem, in order to investigate the scope and limits of generalized quantifiers in finite model theory. We obtain sharp lower bounds for expressibility in the logics L∞ωω and discover an intrinsic difference between adding finitely many simple unary generalized quantifiers to L∞ωω adding infinitely many. In particular, we show that if Qis a finite sequence of simple unary generalized quantifiers, then the equicardinality, or Härtig, quantifier is not definable in L∞ωω. We also show that the query “does the equivalence relation E have an even number of equivalence classes” is not definable in the extension L∞ωω of L∞ωω by the Härtig quantifier I and any finite sequence Q of simple unary generalized quantifiers. (shrink)

By , we denote the system of second-order arithmetic based on recursive comprehension axioms and Σ10 induction. is defined to be plus weak König's lemma: every infinite tree of sequences of 0's and 1's has an infinite path. In this paper, we first show that for any countable model M of , there exists a countable model M′ of whose first-order part is the same as that of M, and whose second-order part consists of the M-recursive sets and sets not (...) in the second-order part of M. By combining this fact with a certain forcing argument over universal trees, we obtain the following result : if proves X!Y with arithmetical, so does . We also discuss several improvements of this results. (shrink)

We define theories of bounded arithmetic, whose definable functions and relations are exactly those in certain complexity classes. Based on a recursion-theoretic characterization of NC in Clote , the first-order theory TNC, whose principal axiom scheme is a form of short induction on notation for nondeterministic polynomial-time computable relations, has the property that those functions having nondeterministic polynomial-time graph Θ such that TNC x y Θ are exactly the functions in NC, computable on a parallel random-access machine in polylogarithmic parallel (...) time with a polynomial number of processors.0 We then define three theories of weak second-order arithmetic which respectively characterize relations in the classes of alternating logarithmic time, logspace and nondeterministic logspace. (shrink)

Two constructions for adding an involution operator to residuated ordered monoids are investigated. One preserves integrality and the mingle axiom x 2x but fails to preserve the contraction property xx 2. The other has the opposite preservation properties. Both constructions preserve commutativity as well as existent nonempty meets and joins and self-dual order properties. Used in conjunction with either construction, a result of R.T. Brady can be seen to show that the equational theory of commutative distributive residuated lattices (without involution) (...) is decidable, settling a question implicitly posed by P. Jipsen and C. Tsinakis. The corresponding logical result is the (theorem-) decidability of the negation-free axioms and rules of the logic RW, formulated with fusion and the Ackermann constant t. This completes a result of S. Giambrone whose proof relied on the absence of t. (shrink)

Evidence from egocentric space is cited to support bicoding of navigation in three-dimensional space. Horizontal distances and space are processed differently from the vertical. Indeed, effector systems are compatible in horizontal space, but potentially incompatible (or chaotic) during transitions to vertical motion. Navigation involves changes in coordinates, and animal models of navigation indicate that time has an important role.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.3 (2003) 255-259 [Access article in PDF] Illnesses and Likenesses Richard G. T. Gipps IN THIS RESPONSE to Neil Pickering's paper I shall focus only on what he describes as the "strong objection" to the typical use of the likeness argument. The likeness argument, to recap, has it that we can decide whether conditions such as schizophrenia, depression, or alcoholism do or do not deserve (...) the designation of illness depending on whether they possess features which, if they occurred in physical conditions, would enable one to decide for or against the designation. To take an implausible example, if it were decided that it would be enough to describe a physical condition as an illness if it involves pain not caused through injury, then a psychological condition would be appropriately described as an illness just to the extent that it too involved such pain.In arguing against typical deployments of the likeness argument, Pickering finds that it is only on questionable initial descriptions of psychological conditions that such conditions appear to share the features that, in physical conditions, would be taken to be indicative of illness. That is to say, theorists who deploy the likeness argument to urge either the reality or unreality of mental illnesses typically presuppose what both we and they had all along hoped would be demonstrated in their argument. In terms of the above example, we might say that a certain psychological condition can count as an illness if it involves psychic pain. The concept of psychic pain is however (so the argument would have it) contestable; there exist other descriptions that make no reference to pain and in so doing fail to provide what a user of the likeness argument would need to substantiate the claim that a conception of the condition as an illness is more than a façon de parler.By way of arriving at this conclusion the following precondition for the applicability of the likeness argument (Pickering's "assumption" (2)) is insisted on: "That, with respect to the presence or absence of [those features of conditions which features decide whether or not the conditions are illnesses], a condition such as schizophrenia [must be] describable independently of the category it is assigned to." This can seem a quite reasonable restriction, for—it could be said—one can only win an argument if it is first allowed that there is actually something to argue about. That is, it is only if both partisans and detractors of the illness conception first accept a certain description of schizophrenia as spelling out what schizophrenia essentially involves that they can then progress to determining whether or not such a condition so described is or is not an illness.Yet, whereas this seems like a perfectly reasonable requirement, it is I believe uncertain whether it will always capture the form of the intuitions of adherents and detractors of the illness conception—or of the form of philosophical arguments more generally. To be sure, some philosophical discussions can perhaps be reconstructed as debates about the validity of certain inferences [End Page 255] from mutually understood premises (i.e., given X, does Y follow or not?). Yet if this were the case, then genuinely interesting philosophical arguments would probably be few and far between. If we are agreed as to the precise significance of our premises, and are not furthermore just making straightforward mistakes in reasoning, it is hard to see how or why we could all fail to arrive at the same conclusions.In the Philosophical Investigations paragraph 128 Wittgenstein wrote that "If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them, because everyone would agree to them" (Wittgenstein 1953). Now that proposition might seem on rather weak grounds, because all one has to do to actually disprove it is merely disagree with it. But presumably Wittgenstein is rather articulating his intuition that although philosophical arguments often take the form of clashes concerning what conclusions can be drawn from what premises, most of their substance comes from a prior failure to unpack the intrinsic significance... (shrink)

Important examples of $\Pi^0_1$ classes of functions $f \in {}^\omega\omega$ are the classes of sets (elements of ω 2) which separate a given pair of disjoint r.e. sets: ${\mathsf S}_2(A_0, A_1) := \{f \in{}^\omega2 : (\forall i < 2)(\forall x \in A_i)f(x) \neq i\}$ . A wider class consists of the classes of functions f ∈ ω k which in a generalized sense separate a k-tuple of r.e. sets (not necessarily pairwise disjoint) for each k ∈ ω: ${\mathsf S}_k(A_0,\ldots,A_k-1) := (...) \{f \in {}^\omega k : (\forall i < k) (\forall x \in A_i) f(x) \neq i\}$ . We study the structure of the Medvedev degrees of such classes and show that the set of degrees realized depends strongly on both k and the extent to which the r.e. sets intersect. Let ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ denote the Medvedev degrees of those ${\mathsf S}_k(A_0,\ldots,A_{k-1})$ such that no m + 1 sets among A 0,...,A k-1 have a nonempty intersection. It is shown that each ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ is an upper semi-lattice but not a lattice. The degree of the set of k-ary diagonally nonrecursive functions $\mathsf{DNR}_k$ is the greatest element of ${\mathcal S}^1_k$ . If 2 ≤ l < k, then 0 M is the only degree in ${\mathcal S}^1_l$ which is below a member of ${\mathcal S}^1_k$ . Each ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ is densely ordered and has the splitting property and the same holds for the lattice ${\mathcal L}^m_k$ it generates. The elements of ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ are exactly the joins of elements of ${\mathcal S}^1_i$ for $\lceil{k \over m}\rceil \leq i \leq k$. (shrink)

Aus bekannten Versuchsergebnissen und Naturbeobachtungen lÄsst sich ein Mechanismus der ontogenetischen Evolution und Involution ableiten, der mit den unten stehenden vier GrundsÄtzen gekennzeichnet werden kann. Es wird dabei als anerkannt vorausgesetzt, dass die Entwicklung der Lebewesen auf genotypischen Potenzen beruht, die nach Einwirkung bestimmter Umweltreize bestimmte phÄnotypische Effekte bewirken. Es wird als “phylogenetischer Auslesefaktor” einer genotypischen Potenz derjenige Faktor der Äusseren oder inneren Umwelt bezeichnet, an den in der Phylogenese die Anpassung erfolgt ist. Der phylogenetische Auslesefaktor einer genotypischen Potenz wird (...) in der Ontogenese als genaktivierender Manifestationsreiz für den entsprechenden phÄnotypischen Effekt rekapituliert. Nach dem Ende des genaktivierenden Manifestationsreizes nimmt der von diesem Reiz abhÄngige Aktivierungszustand der genotypischen Potenz in charakteristischer Weise ab, und entsprechend bildet sich der von diesem Genaktivierungszustand abhÄngige phÄnotypische Effekt zurück; infolgedessen wird der phÄnotypische Effekt je nach der verschiedenen ReizabhÄngigkeit des Genaktivierungszustandes manifest als reizabhÄngige Modifikation, als vorübergehend reizunabhÄngige Dauermodifikation oder als fortgepflanzte vorübergehend reizunabhÄngige Dauermodifikation. Bei der ontogenetischen Evolution ist im Bereich der inneren Umwelt der phÄnotypische Effekt einer Entwicklungsstufe als rekapitulierter phylogenetischer Auslesefaktor der genotypischen Potenz der nÄchsten Entwicklungsstufe auch der genaktivierende Manifestationsreiz für den phÄnotypischen Effekt der nÄchsten Entwicklungsstufe . Bei Beendigung der ontogenetischen Evolution mit PhÄn x ist im Bereich der inneren Umwelt PhÄn x−1 der phylogenetische Auslesefaktor für Gen x−1 und wird als der genaktivierende Manifestationsreiz für PhÄn x rekapituliert. Mit der Manifestation von PhÄn x verschwindet PhÄn x−1 und damit auch der von ihm ausgehende genaktivierende Manifestationsreiz für PhÄn x ; infolgedessen beginnt die ontogenetische Involution von PhÄn x nach Massgabe der StabilitÄt des Aktivierungsgrades von Gen x−1.The development of living individuals is due to genotypical potencies, which lead to certain phenotypical effects after the influence of certain stimuli of the environment. The factor of the exogenous or endogenous environment to which adaptation has occurred during the phylogenesis is defined as the phylogenetical selectionfactor.A mechanism of ontogenetical evolution and involution is deduced from known experimental results and observations. This mechanism can be characterized by the following four main principles. The phylogenetical selectionfactor of a genotypical potency is recapitulated during ontogenesis as the gene-activating stimulus for the manifestation of the corresponding phenotypical effect. After the cessation of the gene-activating stimulus the activation of the genotypical potency declines in a characteristic manner. And according to it the phenotypical effect being dependent on this condition of gene-activation is involuted. This means that a phenotypical effect is manifest as stimulus dependent modification, as a temporary stimulus independent modification or as a temporary stimulus independent modification which is transmitted from generation to generation. During the ontogenetical evolution the phenotypical effect in a certain step of the development in the sphere of the endogenous environment is the manifestation stimulus activating the gene for the phenotypical effect of the following developmental step , since Phene n or Substrate n is the recapitulated selectionfactor for the genotypical potency of this step . When the ontogenetical evolution ends with the appearance of Phene n , Phene x−1 is the phylogenetical selectionfactor for Gene x−1 in the endogenous environment and is recapitulated as the gene-activating stimulus for the manifestation of Phene x . By the manifestation of Phene x Phene x−1 vanishes and thus the manifestationstimulus for Phene x . Consequently the ontogenetical involution of Phene x begins according to the degree of instability of the activated condition of Gene x−1. (shrink)

Let A be a standard transitive admissible set. Σ 1 -separation is the principle that whenever X and Y are disjoint Σ A 1 subsets of A then there is a Δ A 1 subset S of A such that $X \subseteq S$ and $Y \cap S = \varnothing$ . Theorem. If A satisfies Σ 1 -separation, then (1) If $\langle T_n\mid n is a sequence of trees on ω each of which has at most finitely many infinite paths in (...) A then the function $n\mapsto$ (set of infinite paths in A through T n ) is in A. (2) If A is not closed under hyperjump and α = On A then A has in it a nonstandard model of V = L whose ordinal standard part is α. Theorem. Let α be any countable admissible ordinal greater than ω. Then there is a model of Σ 1 -separation whose height is α. (shrink)

Endeavors have been made to found and incorporate ethical values in most aspects of healthcare, including health technology assessment. Health technologies and their assessment are value-laden and could trigger problems with dissemination if they contradict societal norms. Per WHO definition, preconception expanded carrier screening is a new health technology that warrants assessment. It is a genetic test offered to couples who have no known risk of recessive genetic diseases and are interested pregnancy. A test may screen for carrier status of (...) several autosomal recessive diseases and X-linked at one go. The technique has been piloted in the Netherlands and is discussed in other countries. The aim of the study was to examine values and value conflicts that healthcare experts recounted in relation to the discussion of implementation and use of preconception ECS in Sweden. We interviewed ten experts, who were associated with influencing health policymaking in Sweden. We employed systematizing expert interviews, which endeavor to access experts’ specialist knowledge. There were four female and six male informants, of which four were physicians, three bioethicists, one a legal expert, one a theologian and one a political party representative in the parliament. The participants functioned as members of two non-governmental bodies and three governmental organizations. We employed thematic analysis to identify themes, categories and subcategories. Two main themes surfaced: values and value conflicts. The main categories of Respect for persons, Solidarity, Human dignity, Do no harm, Health and Love formed the first theme, while values conflicting with autonomy and integrity respectively, constituted the second theme. Concepts relating to respect for persons were the most commonly mentioned among the participants, followed by notions alluding to solidarity. Furthermore, respondents discussed values conflicting with Swedish healthcare ones such as equality and solidarity. The experts highlighted values and concepts that are distinctive of welfare states such as Sweden and delineated how preconception ECS could challenge such values. Moreover, the analysis revealed that certain values were deemed more substantive than others, judging by the extent and detail of inference; for example, respect for persons and solidarity were on top of the list. (shrink)

In his long and illuminating paper [1] Joe Barback defined and showed to be non-vacuous a class of infinite regressive isols he has termed “complete y torre” isols. These particular isols a enjoy a property that Barback has since labelled combinatoriality. In [2], he provides a list of properties characterizing the combinatoria isols. In Section 2 of our paper, we extend this list of characterizations to include the fact that an infinite regressive isol X is combinatorial if and only if (...) its associated Dekker semiring D satisfies all those Π2 sentences of the anguage LN for isol theory that are true in the set ω of natural numbers. of the various function and relation symbols of LN via the “lifting ” to D of their Σ1 definitions in ω coincide with their interpretations via isolic extension.) We also note in Section 2 that Π2-correctness, for semirings D, cannot be improved to Π 3-correctness, no matter how many additional properties we succeed in attaching to a combinatoria isol; there is a fixed equation image sentence that blocks such extension. In Section 3, we provide a proof of the existence of combinatorial isols that does not involve verification of the extremely strong properties that characterize Barback's CT isols. (shrink)

The sum, difference, product and quotient of two functions with different domains are usually defined only on their common domain. This paper extends these definitions so that the sum and other operations are essentially defined anywhere that at least one of the components is defined. This idea is applied to propositions and events, expressed as indicator functions, to define conditional propositions and conditional events as three-valued indicator functions that are undefined when their condition is false. Extended operations of "and", "or", (...) "not" and "conditioning" are then defined on these conditional events with variable conditions. The probabilities of the disjunction and of the conjunction of two conditionals are expressed in terms of the conditional probabilities of the component conditionals. In a special case, these are shown to be weighted averages of the component conditional probabilities where the weights are the relative probabilities of the various conditions. Next, conditional random variables are defined to be random variables X whose domain has been restricted by a condition on a second random variable Y. The extended sum, difference, product and conditioning operations on functions are then applied to these conditional random variables. The expectation of a random variable and the conditional expectation of a conditional random variable are recounted. Theorem 1 generalizes the standard result that the conditional expectation of the sum of two conditional random variables with disjoint and exhaustive conditions is a weighted sum of the conditional expectations of the component conditional random variables. Because of the extended operations, the theorem is true for arbitrary conditions. Theorem 2 gives a formula for the expectation of the product of two conditional random variables. After the definition of independence of two random variables is extended to accommodate the extended operations, it is applied to the formula of Theorem 2 to simplify the expectation of a product of conditional random variables. Two examples end the paper. The first concerns a work force of n workers of different output levels and work shifts. The second example involves two radars with overlapping surveillance regions and different detection error rates. One radar's error rate is assumed to be sensitive to fog and the other radar's error rate is assumed to be sensitive to air traffic density. The combined error rate over the combined surveillance region given heavy fog and moderate air traffic is computed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Isocrates and Civic EducationRobert G. SullivanIsocrates and Civic Education. Edited by Takis Poulakis and David Depew. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004. Pp. x + 277. $50.00, hardcover.Henry Burrowes Lathrop, in his magisterial Translations from the Classics into English from Caxton to Chapman, adopted a distinctly apologetic tone for having included in that book a lengthy gloss of Isocrates' writings. He felt constrained to do so, noting, "This (...) fairly long exposition has been necessary, since Isocrates is little read nowadays." Well, of course, "nowadays" Isocrates is read a great deal, and he is generally considered to be one of the more important figures in the classical rhetorical tradition. There are a variety of reasons for the revival of Isocrates' fortunes; he has always been accepted as an exemplar of style, and has exerted strong influences in a number of historical eras, but he is seen increasingly as an original and significant rhetorical theorist. However, the strongest attraction to scholars of our era is the connection by Isocrates of two concepts, rhetorical discourse and civic education, in what he called hê tôn logôn padieia. At the nexus of these ideas is not merely a historically interesting aspect of classical rhetorical theory but an important link between rhetorical theory and political practice, of heightened importance to a democratic culture.The volume under consideration gathers some of the best informed contemporary scholars to address this confluence. The ten essays include work by classicists, philosophers, and rhetoricians, all of whom are working in an explicitly interdisciplinary posture. The volume is divided into five thematic sections, with two essays contributed on each of the themes, each pair addressing different aspects of Isocrates' notion of civic education.The first section addresses the shape and purpose of the Isocratean program of civic education. The central question addressed by these essays is fundamental. If we grant the generality that Isocrates has a program of civic education, what are the particular goals of his pedagogy? Simply put, what civic virtues can one expect to acquire from an education in the Isocratean system? For Josiah Ober the route to the answering of this question is a careful and extraordinarily interesting reading of Isocrates great apologia, Antidosis. Ober sees Isocrates attempting to develop in his students a "complex and integral identity" (39) that will allow them to remain both true to themselves and useful to the city, a careful blending of soul-craft and state-craft. Takis Poulakos focuses on the epistemological foundation of Isocratean practice by making a careful account of Isocrates' use of the term doxa. Poulakos does an excellent [End Page 174] job of cutting through the thicket of Isocratean nuance and correctly identifies the theoretically charged notion of doxa as being both the process and product of informed conjecture.The next six essays are, in essence, comparative, laying Isocratean concepts of civic virtue and pedagogy against those of the sophists, Aristotle, and Plato. John Poulakos deftly separates Isocrates' purposes and pedagaogy from the sophists Protagoras and Gorgias. Particularly striking is the distinction Poulakos draws between how Isocrates and the sophists conceived of the power of language. The sophists, having a "dynastic" conception of language, imagine that mastering rhetoric gives one direct access to tyranical power over the individual psyche. Isocrates, less sure of (or perhaps ethically nervous about) language's capacity for political witchcraft, adapts a "hegemonic" notion of logos as acivilizing force, a means of leadership toward good ends. Ekaterina Haskins contrasts the "playful iconoclasm" of Gorgias with the "political responsibility" of Isocrates (85) in the varying ways they make use of the mythopoetic tradition. Davis Konstans contributes an extremely interesting examination of important matters upon which Isocrates and Plato find themselves in agreement, notably the deficiencies of Athenian democracy and the preferred role of the intellectual in society. Konstans' position is very stimulating, if at first glance counterintuitive, as the greater part of modern scholarship has aimed to force these two figures into opposing camps. Kathryn Morgan also begins her essay by focusing on those things Plato and Isocrates agreed upon, noting that both were deeply dissatisfied with conventional civic education in Athens. From this, Morgan turns to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Madness, Reason, and PrideRichard G.T. Gipps, PhD (bio)MadnessQuestions such as “what’s madness?” or “what’s reason?” carry no singular sense about with them wherever they go—which isn’t to say that, asked out of a particular interest in a particular context, they can’t be perfectly intelligible. Garson (2023) is wise to this when he follows “what is madness?” with “as opposed to what?”, even if this latter question itself hardly enjoys (...) a clear sense in the initial context of his asking. What counts as a satisfactory answer to “what’s x?” varies, so that sometimes we’ll be satisfied with a name, at other times by information about something’s genus, origin, function, or composition. Things get notoriously tricky when in the philosophical context the question is asked with a presumption of intelligibility despite ‘x’ being, say, an abstract noun formed from an adjective (‘consciousness’ out of ‘conscious’; ‘happiness’ out of ‘happy’; ‘madness’ out of ‘mad,’ etc.). For “what is?” questions are typically most perspicuously mooted when what’s being pursued are enquiries into (what we might call) the ‘essential nature’ of (what philosophers used to call) ‘substances’ or (of what are more ordinarily called) types of ‘thing’ or ‘entity.’ Invoke, by taking one’s lead from the fact that an ‘x’ is grammatically speaking a substantive, the specter of substance, and you can endlessly baffle yourself by now pondering the mysteries of the putative thing. (Vide discussions of “the nature of consciousness.”) Hence the boon of instead pursuing questions of an ‘opposed to what?’ sort; hence Wittgenstein considering using the Earl of Kent’s “I’ll teach you differences” (King Lear) as a motto for his Investigations. Rather more reflective wisdom regarding ‘x’ may thus be gained when we learn to contrast it with ‘y’ and ‘z’ than when peering into x’s non-existent constitution or groping for its never-instituted genus.Later, I make the case that Garson’s conception of reason itself might suffer from a form of substantialization and that, if I’m right in this, troubling implications follow for his approach to madness. But let’s begin by considering his enquiry into the relation of madness, idiocy and reason. So perhaps we’re reflecting on matters legal, and considering—since we’d hitherto been inclined to take ‘reason’ as univocal—what justifies our different treatments of the insane, the intellectually subnormal, and the normal. Or perhaps—proceeding from the same inclination—we’re puzzled by how someone may boast an exceptional IQ or demonstrate marvelous formal rationality (i.e., make deductions of a sort which would please the logician if no-one else) and yet still be quite mad. And then we realize that at which Garson’s Late Moderns seem to have been gesturing: The lack of reason qua intelligence in idiocy is a different [End Page 307] species from the lack of reason qua sanity in madness. An amethyst is lifeless in a different manner than an expired possum (it was never living, never moribund); the arational lack reason in a different sense than do the irrational (and a baobab cannot jump to conclusions.) There is, say his Late Modern theorists, something ‘perverse’ rather than simply deficient about the irrationality of madness.Now an important part of Garson’s thesis has it that “idiocy is a better candidate for the opposite of reason than madness.” One of the reasons for his making this claim is that he follows his Late Moderns in claiming that madness has reason somehow alive within it, albeit in an unconventional or surprising form. I return to his own explication of this below. Consider first, though, the different thought-referencing descriptions under which the speech acts of the thought-disordered, the speech-disordered, the delusional, and the learning disabled subject may be brought. The sufferer of speech disorder has difficulty with fluency or sound production, but once we get used to this we can find our way to the bona fide rational thought immanent within their discourse. The speech acts of the intellectually impaired subject aren’t chaotic, but instead want for invention and richness; they fail to express... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC)Carlos SteelJohn M. Dillon. The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. x + 252. Cloth, $65.00.When Plato died, in 347 BC, he left behind not only the collection of philosophical dialogues we still read with admiration, but also a remarkable organization, the "Academy," wherein his students continued (...) the discussion he had initiated. Dillon's latest book is an attempt to recreate the intellectual climate in the Academy during the first generations after Plato's death, the "Old Academy," called thus to distinguish it from the "New Academy," which started with Arcesilaus in the mid 270's, who abandoned doctrinal speculations for a sceptical stance. Given the elusive nature of the dialogues, the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has been controversial from the beginning. Therefore, scholars always have been eager to know in which direction Plato's first successors—Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo—took the Academy; thus they hoped to find some justification for their own interpretation of Plato. Unfortunately, our information on the doctrines of Plato's first successors is scarce. Browsing through the fragments collected by scholars, one may be tempted to conclude that it is not such a great disaster that most texts of the Old Academy have been lost. For it seems that the Academy after Plato was leaning towards a rather esoteric metaphysical speculation about the first principles, which makes us lament on what has become of the philosophical heritage of Plato, a genius fallen into the hands of epigones. One gets the impression that the original and refreshing philosophical contributions came from outside the Academy, from the Lyceum founded by Aristotle and continued by Theophrastus, and later from Epicurus and Zeno and their new schools, which will dominate the Hellenistic period. This, however, is not the view of Dillon: "It will be the thesis of this book that Speusippus and Xenocrates set the agenda for what was to become, over the succeeding centuries, the intellectual tradition which we call Platonism" (v). Even early Stoicism is, in Dillon's view, a "development and formalization of contemporary Platonism" (235).In an introductory chapter Dillon discusses the location and juridical structure of the Academy and gives a general survey of the main doctrines of the school. The following three chapters present the lives, work and thought of the first heads of the Academy; a final chapter is devoted to some minor members of the early Academy. The book concludes with a short epilogue on Arcesilaus and the reasons for his turn to scepticism. Dillon is an [End Page 204] excellent writer who knows how to tease out and expound the most abstruse philosophical doctrines in a captivating way, mixing, as he does here, biographical anecdotes and witty comments with a sharp analysis of arguments and a speculative reconstruction of lost doctrines. I doubt, however, whether this book will become such a classic as his celebrated The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977).My first worry is anticipated by Dillon himself: "This is perforce a rather speculative book, and no doubt it will be criticized for that" (vii). Dillon defends himself against this critique: I have tried, he says, "to put the most favourable construction on the evidence available to us," his assumption being that the figures he is dealing with "were not philosophical imbeciles"(vii). My reservations are not about Dillon's attempt to construct a coherent doctrine using all relevant information on an author, but about his method of reconstruction, in particular his speculation and his preference for often questionable later material to fill the gaps in our information. "With a good deal of speculation, our exiguous information on Polemo's philosophical position can be fleshed out somewhat" (176). Thus, in his exposition of Speusippus's doctrine of the first principles, Dillon does not start from Aristotle, considering him too biased, but from chapter 4 of Iamblichus's treatise De communi mathematica scientia. In this Neo-Pythagorean treatise, Speusippus is not even mentioned. Even if there are arguments, as Dillon believes, to attribute the doctrine of Chapter 4 to Speusippus, one should... (shrink)

The author has recently proposed a “quasi-classical” theory of particles and interactions in which particles are pictured as extended periodic disturbances in a universal field χ(x, t), interacting with each other via nonlinearity in the equation of motion for χ. The present paper explores the relationship of this theory to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics; as a first step, it is shown how it is possible to construct from χ a configuration-space wave function Ψ(x 1,x 2,t), and that the theory requires that (...) Ψ satisfy the two-particle Schrödinger equation in the case where the two particles are well separated from each other. This suggests that the multiparticle Schrödinger equation can be obtained as a direct consequence of the quasi-classical theory without any use of the usual formalism (Hilbert space, quantization rules, etc.) of conventional quantum theory and in particular without using the classical canonical treatment of a system as a “crutch” theory which has subsequently to be “quantized.” The quasi-classical theory also suggests the existence of a preferred “absolute” gauge for the electromagnetic potentials. (shrink)

As far as I know, Kaibel is the only champion of the soundness of our text in this passage. In his edition of the Electra he has the following note : ‘Zu τòν xs22EFxs025Bxs22EF πατρóς ist, wie Haupt gezeigt hat , der Nominal-begriff aus dem Verbum zu ergäanzen, genau wie in μxs22EFανδικxs22EFζxs025Bιν, διττxs22EFν παxs1FD6σαι u. a. statt des Adjektivs steht das durch den Artikel gestützte Adverbium, vgl. Arist. Ran. 191 νxs025Bναυμxs22EFχηκxs025B τxs22EFν πxs025Bρxs22EF τxs22EFν κρxs025Bxs22EFν und das sprüchwörtliche τòν πxs025Bρxs22EF ψυχ࿆ς (...) τpεXειv. So ist auch der Komikervers ganz in Ordnung εγω Tov αλλov, αvδρεs, εTεθvηkη πáλaι aπavθ', ôv εζηv, wo zu εζηv und also auch zu ετεθvηkη sich ein Nominal-begriff wie βιóv oder χρóvov von selbst ergánzt; denn auf ein bestimmtes Nomen kommt nichts an, da kein Grieche thatsáchlich ein Nomen ergánzte, sondern den Begriff aus dem Verbum heraushörte.’ He concludes: ‘So unzweifelhaft richtig Haupts Erklärung ist, so pflegt man sie neuerdings doch wieder zu ignoriren oder zu verwerfen und die allerungläublichsten “Emendationen” zu bevorzugen.’ With the latter part of his assertion I fully agree, and am prepared to throw all emendations that have been so far suggested overboard. But with due diffidence I beg to try my hand once more at emending this passage, as I firmly believe that Sophocles has not written it as handed down to us. τóv aεì…στεváχovσ' is intolerably weak. It is far more likely that we have here a case of the wrong division of words. In uncials we should have read: HAEKTPATON, which ought to have been transcribed ΉHλεkτρ’. (shrink)

Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) is a progressive and lethal neuromuscular disorder caused by a defective gene on the X chromosome. There is no effective treatment and the biochemical defect is yet unknown. Mapping of the DMD locus to band Xp21 in the short arm of the X chromosome has given rise to strategies to clone the gene from its known location in the chromosome. Two cloning strategies have led to the isolation of a gene that is the largest of any (...) yet described. Portions of the gene are deleted in about 8% of affected males, and rare translocations that disrupt the gene cause the disease in females. The isolation of expressed sequences from the DMD locus will undoubtedly lead to isolation of the gene product and ultimately to an understanding of the basic defect. In the meantime, DNA probes from the DMD locus provide a new and accurate approach for carrier identification and prenatal diagnosis of this dreaded disease. (shrink)

En "Die Aktualität des Schönen. Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest", H.-G. Gadamer recordaba que en la modernidad la progresiva ruptura con el consolidado repertorio humanista y cristiano con contenidos susceptibles de recreación artística, da lugar a una nueva situación: «El artista ya no pronuncia el lenguaje de la comunidad, sino que se construye su propia comunidad al proferirse en lo más íntimo de sí mismo» (Gesammelte Werke 8, pág. 94 y ss.). Este proceso dará lugar a la inevitable conformación (...) de una nueva comunidad potencial que habrá de extenderse a todo el mundo habitado, es decir, a toda oikumene. Es interesante notar que Gadamer sostenga que esto sea así, necesariamente, y en virtud de dos razones, a saber: o bien porque toda obra de arte trasluce una visión del mundo (ora presente, ora futurible), o bien porque, para quien la contempla, y si la tal visión es ajena a uno o incomprensible o incluso inconmensurable, se presenta ésta, al cabo, como una confrontación que puede conducir al aprendizaje de la desconocida lengua de aquel y aquello que nos está hablando. Dos procesos estos complejos, enfrentados y de honda raigambre política (no sólo estética) sobre los que podría, en efecto, decirse mucho, y que aquí se resaltan para hacer ver que el arte —o bien porque trasluce una visión del mundo compartida, o bien porque nos confronta, por mediación del lenguaje, con una comprensión del mundo enteramente desconocida— es una experiencia comunitaria. Sobre esto versa la obra gadameriana antedicha, a saber: acerca de las experiencias comunitarias como instantes de actualización de lo bello. De alguna manera, es a la luz de esta problemática profusamente aquilatada en las obras del arte no figurativo del siglo XX como cabe entender la tradición estética y política en la que —según se lee en el prólogo que Gianni Vattimo ha dedicado a esta obra— se orienta cada vez más la finalidad estética de crear «acontecimientos en lugar de “objetos”» (pág. 20). (shrink)

We can see from the analysis set out here that the two accounts that were the focus of consideration are complementary to one another. It has been my contention that a problem like specifying a concept such as ‘refrain’ is highly complex. One part of it is the problem of determining the relation between the action (or event) and the result. Another part of the problem is that of describing the event itself; what kind of an event is it? These (...) two projects are related and so it is clear that the results must be consistent. However, it is equally clear that the definition which is useful for one project is not the same as that which is helpful for another. The point is that it should not be assumed that an account that initially looks incompatible with one's own must be refuted. It is sometimes better to consider what is needed for a complete account, and whether many different approaches may contribute pieces to the puzzle.We have here one puzzle piece: an analysis of refraining. It should not be assumed that we have thereby completed the puzzle of omission, but omission can be approached the same way; that is, by coordinating parallel projects.Accordingly, the first benefit of the present analysis is that it sets up an approach which is modular in nature. It allows for parallel projects to be pursued separately and coordinated. This kind of approach is sorely needed in this area to counter unproductive dispute.To see how such an approach can be applied to further problems profitably consider the following persistent controversy. Many philosophers are at odds over the importance of the notion of duty, or more informally, reasonable expectation in the understanding of refraining. A number of them (e.g., Hart and Honore, John Casey, and Phillipa Foot) hold that the determining feature for the ascription of responsibility to an agent for not doing something to prevent a harm (say, a death) is the presence of a duty or reasonable expectation that the agent do something about the situation. For example, John Casey holds, “If a man does not do x, we cannot properly say that his not doing x is the cause of some result y, unless in the normal course of events he could have been expected to do x.” Casey, Actions and Consequences (1978).Other philosophers object that a person can cause a result by refraining from (causally) preventing it, and that such an event can be explained without any reference to duty. These two views appear to conflict, but in fact they are both right (but both incomplete). The reason that the above statements are generally thought to constitute a disagreement is that ‘refrain’ is generally taken as the fundamental term of analysis for omissions. Thus, if Casey says, “If a man does not do x...” he is taken to mean “...if a man refrains from doing x...” But he need not mean that. He may mean to say only that the man failed to do x. See my analysis in “Contemplating Failure,” supra note 10. Failing to do something can be, and ordinarily is, thought of as stronger than simple nonaction. But it is much weaker than refraining. For one thing, it has no awareness requirement. Thus, an account like Casey's can explain the ascription of responsibility and the presence of an omission where Green's account (or the account offered here) cannot, and vice versa. Casey's view can explain why we hold (or at least that we hold) responsible the night watchman who forgets to check one of the windows, the bookkeeper who (accidentally) omits an entry in the accounts, or the private duty nurse who fails to prevent a death by falling asleep on the job. No refraining is present in any of these cases. Consequently, any thesis based on refraining alone cannot explain them. But in many cases refraining is precisely what is important, and Green (and others of the same persuasion) are correct to point out that no reference to duty is necessarily required to account for these cases. Analysis based on refraining best explains intentional or conscious omission. Analysis based on duty or reasonable expectation is the only way to explain unconscious omission. More often than not, both elements are present. A complete account of omission needs both. So here again, the better way to view these putatively competing accounts is as parallel projects which work toward a common, but complex end. The approach taken here allows for this kind of much needed coordination. The second benefit of the present analysis is that it clarifies and focuses on the significance of the mental element of refraining. Refraining is conscious omission. Consciousness and omission are its distinguishing features. The effects of seeing the concept this way are pervasive. Here is one example. If I refrain from reporting my full income to the IRS, I have committed fraud, and punitive or even criminal sanctions may be reasonable. If I fail to report my full income through ignorance or mistake (say, I misunderstood the instructions) correcting the error and requiring payment is reasonable, but certainly criminal sanction is not. This oversimplifies the distinction, but it illustrates the focus of my pursuit.With regard to positive actions, law and philosophy have long recognized this important distinction as manifested in the difference between negligence and intentional tort, or manslaughter and murder. Due (I think) to the extraordinary flexibility of language and the weakness and variability of social conventions regarding omissions, this distinction has not been clearly articulated. I think such an analysis is worth pursuing. The present account is one step in that pursuit. (shrink)

A mass problem is a set of Turing oracles. If P and Q are mass problems, we say that P is weakly reducible to Q if for all Y ∈ Q there exists X ∈ P such that X is Turing reducible to Y. A weak degree is an equivalence class of mass problems under mutual weak reducibility. Let [Formula: see text] be the lattice of weak degrees of mass problems associated with nonempty [Formula: see text] subsets of the Cantor (...) space. The lattice [Formula: see text] has been studied in previous publications. The purpose of this paper is to show that [Formula: see text] partakes of hyperarithmeticity. We exhibit a family of specific, natural degrees in [Formula: see text] which are indexed by the ordinal numbers less than [Formula: see text] and which correspond to the hyperarithmetical hierarchy. Namely, for each [Formula: see text], let hα be the weak degree of 0, the αth Turing jump of 0. If p is the weak degree of any mass problem P, let p* be the weak degree of the mass problem P* = {Y | ∃X ⊆ BLR )} where BLR is the set of functions which are boundedly limit recursive in X. Let 1 be the top degree in [Formula: see text]. We prove that all of the weak degrees [Formula: see text], [Formula: see text], are distinct and belong to [Formula: see text]. In addition, we prove that certain index sets associated with [Formula: see text] are [Formula: see text] complete. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian PhilosophyHarold CowardSemantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy. By Jonardon Ganeri. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. x + 266.In Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy, Jonardon Ganeri adds to our understanding of the Nyāya philosophy of language in the modern English-speaking world. Building on Bimal (...) Matilal's introduction to Nyāya thought in Matilal's foundational Epistemology Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (1971) and on Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya's Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from Gangeśa to Raghunatha Siromani (1993), Ganeri's clearly written book valuably extends our knowledge of the Nyāya philosophy of language by its exposition of the seventeenth-century Nyāya philosopher Gadādhara's Saktivāda or "Essay on Semantic Power." Ganeri's exposition is based on having read the first half of the Saktivāda text with Matilal, before the latter's untimely death, and the second half with Bhattacharyya in Calcutta.In the Saktivāda, Gadādhara defends key Nyāya claims as to how language conveys meaning. In the first half of the text, the author deals with such questions as whether languages are convention-based, whether the central function of language is as an instrument of knowing, whether word meaning or sentence meaning is conceptually prior, and whether the notion of meaning is reducible to physical and/or psychological concepts. In the second half, Gadādhara looks at the semantic problems connected with particular constructions: notably proper and theoretical names, anaphors, indexicals, and the quantifiers. The English exposition of Gadādhara's text offered by Ganeri in this book covers the same topics.According to Gadādhara and the Nyāya philosophy, "the language faculty is a sui generis epistemic faculty, reducible to neither perception nor inference nor some combination of these two. The question for the Naiyāyika is: what properties must the language faculty have if it is in this way to be a source of knowledge?" (p. 15). The Nyāya approach also places an emphasis on testimony as a valid source of knowledge (pramāna), which it understands simply as the transmission by language of knowledge from the speaker to the hearer. The "Communication-intention" variable, discussed by recent thinkers such as McDowell, is not dealt with by Nyāya thinkers, who would deny that the acquisition of knowledge by testimony involves anything like the recognition of the speaker's intentions. Rather, the Nyāya thesis is "that understanding typically consists in direct, non-inferential assent, is in sharp contrast to the assumption implicit in McDowell's position: that assenting to another's utterance is never direct, but always depends on the speaker's intentions, or of the speech-act performed by the speaker" (p. 17). In supporting the Nyāya position, Ganeri appeals to Frege's theory of understanding.The basic idea in the Nyāya philosophy of language is that each of us is endowed with a language faculty, analogous to our perceptual faculty, which generates beliefs from perceived utterances. It has a meaning function. As Ganeri puts it: [End Page 419]My testimonial faculty fixes, as it were, a mapping from utterances of a given language to belief contents. The 'meaning' of a statement for me is, by definition, the belief content to which it is mapped by my testimony faculty. If I am able to understand every statement I hear, the language processing mechanism which underpins this faculty must have a certain compositional structure, and that leads to an assignment of belief-content components to subsequential elements in the language, (p. 29)This thought of Gadādhara, dating from about 1700 C.E., resonates with Chomsky's contemporary ideas of "deep structure" and, in classical Indian philosophy, with Bhartṛhari's fifth-century notion of innate-structuring ideas within consciousness (see Coward and Raja, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 5). Like Bhartṛhari, Gadādhara takes the sentence to be the irreducible meaning-bearing unit of language.While Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya's volume 6 of The Encyclopedia... (shrink)

Nam-In Lee’s impressive study of “instinct” in Husserl1 gives a new sense to Husserl’s self-description of his work as a preoccupation with beginnings (see p. x) because it seeks not only to integrate the theme of instinct systematically into Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology but to demonstrate that it has a fundamental position. I believe the author has successfully demonstrated his contention that other students of Husserl who have treated the theme of instinct as a marginal consideration failed to see that Husserl’s (...) genetic phenomenology requires the theory of instinct as its fundamental ingredient (Urstück, 10). The theme of instinct therefore informs the sense of Husserl’s later understanding of transcendental subjectivity and monadology. The book is so packed with discussions that the inevitable omissions of a review run the risk of distorting the merits of the work. (shrink)

A completeness theory for parameterized computational complexity has been studied in a series of recent papers, and has been shown to have many applications in diverse problem domains including familiar graph-theoretic problems, VLSI layout, games, computational biology, cryptography, and computational learning [ADF,BDHW,BFH, DEF,DF1-7,FHW,FK]. We here study the parameterized complexity of two kinds of problems: (1) problems concerning parameterized computations of Turing machines, such as determining whether a nondeterministic machine can reach an accept state in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $k$\end{document} steps (the Short TM Computation Problem), and (2) problems concerning derivations and factorizations, such as determining whether a word \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $x$\end{document} can be derived in a grammar \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $G$\end{document} in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $k$\end{document} steps, or whether a permutation has a factorization of length \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $k$\end{document} over a given set of generators. We show hardness and completeness for these problems for various levels of the \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $W$\end{document} hierarchy. In particular, we show that Short TM Computation is complete for \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $W[1]$\end{document}. This gives a new and useful characterization of the most important of the apparently intractable parameterized complexity classes. (shrink)

Philosophers sometimes wonder whether academic work can ever be truly interdisciplinary. Whether true interdisciplinarity is possible is an open question, but given current trends in higher education, it seems that at least gesturing toward such work is increasingly important. This volume serves as a testament to the fact that such work can be done. Of course, while it is the case that high-level theoretical work can flourish at the intersection of dance and philosophy, it remains to be seen how we (...) might share this with undergraduate students. For many of us in philosophy and dance, a large number of the students we teach are neither philosophy nor dance majors. As such, we are familiar with the challenge of convincing our students to care about our fields. Both philosophy and dance, qua disciplines on a college campus, face similar challenges. These disciplines are often deeply misunderstood, frequently presumed to be “impractical” (a powerful, but confused objection), intimidating, and frivolous. In this chapter, we offer an account of the course we co-taught at Southern Utah University in the Spring of 2016 titled “Movement and Space” as a rough framework for how to introduce the intersection between philosophy and dance to students. We simultaneously attempted to break students of their misconceptions about philosophy and dance, and worked to engage students and professors alike in a truly interdisciplinary educational experience. Treating philosophy as an embodied endeavor, and employing philosophical concepts through the act of dance encouraged students and faculty alike to rethink the fundamental nature of aesthetics. (shrink)

Cet article aborde trois piliers essentiels de la culture maya : l’idée du monde comme un tout harmonieux au sein duquel tous les êtres vivants possèdent une âme ; l’idée de l’homme comme créature responsable de la planète et l’idée du temps envisagé de manière cyclique plutôt que linéaire, comme un devenir infini qui régit le monde et les hommes. L’idée de l’homme chez les Mayas de l’époque préhispanique a été recueillie principalement dans le Popol Vuh, un livre sacré de (...) l’ethnie quiché, écrit par les Mayas eux-mêmes une décennie après la conquête espagnole et dont les conceptions demeurent en partie valides pour les Mayas d’aujourd’hui, notamment la fraternité humain-animal et le devoir qu’ont les hommes de protéger le monde et de veiller à sa préservation. Ces diverses idées sont fondamentales pour ces peuples qui ont réussi à transcender le monde matériel afin d’y déceler des significations plus profondes dans la recherche d’une véritable harmonie cosmique. (shrink)

Cet article aborde trois piliers essentiels de la culture maya : l’idée du monde comme un tout harmonieux au sein duquel tous les êtres vivants possèdent une âme ; l’idée de l’homme comme créature responsable de la planète et l’idée du temps envisagé de manière cyclique plutôt que linéaire, comme un devenir infini qui régit le monde et les hommes. L’idée de l’homme chez les Mayas de l’époque préhispanique a été recueillie principalement dans le Popol Vuh, un livre sacré de (...) l’ethnie quiché, écrit par les Mayas eux-mêmes une décennie après la conquête espagnole et dont les conceptions demeurent en partie valides pour les Mayas d’aujourd’hui, notamment la fraternité humain-animal et le devoir qu’ont les hommes de protéger le monde et de veiller à sa préservation. Ces diverses idées sont fondamentales pour ces peuples qui ont réussi à transcender le monde matériel afin d’y déceler des significations plus profondes dans la recherche d’une véritable harmonie cosmique. (shrink)